

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY PANAMA NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 010987

LIMDIS SAN SALVADOR FOR RSO

FOLLOWING REPEAT MANAGUA 0615 ACTION STATE INFO SAN SALVADOR JAN 14.

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L 0165

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ASEC, NU

SUBJECT: CHIEF OF MISSION SECURITY: THREAT ANALYSIS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS

BEGIN SUMMARY. BY ITSELF, THE ASSASSINATION ON JANUARY 10 OF THE  
SOMOZA REGIME'S MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITIONIST, PEDRO JOAQUIN CHAMORRO,  
INCREASES TENSION IN MANAGUA. IN ITS BROADER CONTEXT, THE EVENTS  
LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT THE RISK TO THE SAFETY OF THE U.S. AMBAS-  
SADOR IN NICARAGUA IS SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER NOW THAN IT HAS BEEN  
FOR SOME MONTHS. HOST GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS FALL SHORT OF MINIMUM  
REQUIREMENTS. EXTRAORDINARY PROTECTIVE MEASURES ARE CALLED FOR UNTIL  
THE SITUATION IS CLEARER. END SUMMARY

1. PEDRO J. CHAMORRO'S SKILLFULLY MANAGED ASSASSINATION WAS ACCOM-  
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PLISHED USING A MODUS OPERANDI NOT SEEN BEFORE IN NICARAGUA. THAT IT  
MAY HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY NON-PROFESSIONALS LEADS TO DEDUCTION  
THT IT COULD BE DUPLICATED WITH GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCESS ALL TOO  
EASILY. IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE LIKELIHOOD THAT A NEW LEVEL OF  
VIOLENCE EXISTS, BUT HEIGHTENED TENSION IS EVIDENT AND SOME KING OF  
VIOLENT ACT AGAINST POSSIBLE TARGETS IS POSSIBLE. SENIOR GOVERNMENT  
FIGURES, CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY, ARE LYING LOW FOR THE TIME

BEING.

2. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION IS PROCEEDING. FOUR SUSPECTS ARE IN CUSTODY AND HAVE NAMED THEIR EMPLOYER TO BE A CUBAN-BORN U.S. CITIZEN. BECAUSE OF THIS REVELATION, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF USG PERSONNEL, AND ESPECIALLY THE AMBASSADOR, ARE LIKELY TO BE GRAVE.

3. TO DRAW THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE THREATS ARE PERCEIVED, THE FOLLOWING POINTS NEED TO BE MADE:

A. SOME POLITICALLY ACTIVE SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION, INCLUDING MANY CLOSE TO CHAMORRO AND THE GROUPS WITH WHICH HE WAS ASSOCIATED, PERCEIVE THE USG, IN SPITE OF ITS ANNOUNCED POLICY AND DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, AS THE BASIC SUPPORTER OF PRESIDENT SOMOZA, HIS REGIME AND, THEREFORE, THOSE NICARAGUAN ELEMENTS WHO MAY HAVE BEEN ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PJC'S COLD-BLOODED MURDER.

B. AT THE OTHER EXTREME ARE THOSE WHO SEE THE USG AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES HERE AS KEY ACTORS IN THE SEARCH FOR ACCOMMODATION LEADING TO PEACEFUL, NON-MARXIST/LENIST RESOLUTION OF THE BASIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH NICARAGUA FACES AND WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS. THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, AS THE SYMBOL OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE AND THEIR POSSIBLE EXCLUSION FROM THE ACTION, IS AN OBVIOUS PRIME TARGET FOR SUCH EXTREMISTS OF THE LEFT (AND HAS BEEN, WE BELIEVE, FOR SOME TIME).

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C. THE CURRENT AMBASSADOR IS A CUBAN-AMERICAN. AMONG KNOWLEDGEABLE CIRCLES HIS ORIGINS ARE KNOWN TO BE ABSOLUTELY SECONDARY TO HIS POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN AMERICAN. BUT IT SHOULD BE ASSUMED THAT HE STANDS OUT AS A LIKELY TARGET FOR THOSE VOLATILE ELEMENTS WHO WILL SEEK TO AVENGE PJC'S DEATH INASMUCH AS A CUBAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION" HAS EMERGED FROM THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION.

4. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, WE CONCLUDE THAT GENERAL THREAT TO AMBASSADOR SOLAUN IS EXTRAORDINARY, AND THAT SPECIAL STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO ENHANCE HIS SECURITY AT THIS TIME. THE AMBASSADOR HAS PERSONALLY DETERMINED THAT WITHOUT ADEQUATE PROTECTION HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REMAIN IN NICARAGUA AND FULFILL HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. THE RSO, WHO IS PRESENTLY AT POST, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE AND THE AMBASSADOR, RECOMMENDS:

A. AN IMMEDIATE APPROACH TO GON AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO SEEK UPGRADING OF THE PROTECTION IT PROVIDES. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY. PERFORMANCE BY THE GON IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, AND THE STEPS LISTED BELOW SHOULD BE TAKEN IN ADDITION TO ANY MEASURES CARRIED OUT BY HOST GOVERNMENT.

B. PROVIDE THE CHIEF OF MISSION A FULLY-ARMORED VEHICLE.

C. ASSIGN A U.S. CITIZEN PROTECTIVE DETAIL TO AMBASSADOR UNTIL THE SITUATION HERE IS CLARIFIED AND, WE HOPE, THE THREAT SUBSIDES.

D. ESTABLISH AN ARMED U.S. MARINE SECURITY GUARD IN UNIFORM AT THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE WITH TECHNICAL AIDS (CCTV AND ALARM SYSTEMS) WHICH CAN BE MONITORED FROM A CENTRAL POST. PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF SUCH A POST WOULD BE TO PROVIDE "LAST BASTION" SECURITY TO THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS FAMILY IN THE EVENT GON SECURITY WERE TO FAIL TO STOP AN ASSUALT ON EMBASSY RESIDENCE. WE BELIEVE ALSO THAT PRESENCE OF U.S. MARINE ON EMBASSY RESIDENCE COMPOUND WILL SERVE AS DETERRENT TO MANY WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERING ASSAULT ON THE AMBASSADOR,  
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ESPECIALLY THOSE WHOSE MOTIVATION MIGHT BE MORE EMOTIONAL THAN POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL. THIS MARINE SECURITY GUARD WOULD NOT, IN ANY MANNER, BE PLACED IN A SUPERVISORY POSITION IN REGARDS TO HOST COUNTRY SECURITY FORCES/GUARDS

E. REDUCE THE UNCONTROLLED AREA OF THE 64 ACRE EMBASSY RESIDENCE COMPOUND, WHICH IS NOT REPEAT NOT NOW FENCED BY INSTALLING A CHAIN LINK FENCE WITH ALARM SYSTEMS AND ILLUMINATION (TO BE USED SELECTIVELY AS NEEDED) WITHIN THE PROPERTY LINES OF THE SITE.

5. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS: IN SUMMARY FORM, SWC AND RSO ESTIMATES FOLLOWING RESOURCES WOULD BE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS OUTLINED ABOVE:

A. FULLY ARMORED SEDAN.

B. LIGHT ARMORED FOLLOW CAR.

C. FOUR (4) SY AGENTS.

D. THREE (E) MSGS.

E. THREE CCTV SYSTEMS TO COVER ALL SIDES OF EMBASSY RESIDENCE PLUS COMPOUND ENTRANCE, INCLUDING INFRA-RED SYSTEMS FOR US IN DARKNESS.

F. RESOURCES NEEDED FOR EMBASSY RESIDENCE FENCE WILL BE SUBJECT SEPTTEL.

G. ADDITIONAL INTRUSION ALARMS AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT MSG AND PROTECTIVE DETAIL.

6. THE AMBASSADOR AND THE EMBASSY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE CONDITIONS WHICH OCCASION THIS ANALYSIS, ITS CONCLUSIONS AND THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MODIFIED WITHIN A REASONABLY SHORT TIME, BUT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW TO PREDICT WHEN THAT MAY BE. THE AMBASSADOR AND THE POST ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO REVIEW THE SITUATION FREQUENTLY WITH A VIEW TO SUGGESTING CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF USG-PROVIDED PROTECTION WHICH MAY BE POSSIBLE. THE DEPARTMENT'S URGENT ATTENTION TO THIS REQUEST WILL BE APPRECIATED. SOLAUN UNQUOTE VANCE  
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